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will then analyze the special characteristics of
the recession to gain some insight into the likely
characteristics of the expansion now getting under
way. I will conclude with a discussion of two
factors that I believe will be particularly impor-
tant for the growth of real output over the years
ahead.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, especially
Dan Thornton and Kevin Kliesen, for their com-
ments, but I retain full responsibility for errors.
THE 1991-2001 ECONOMIC
EXPANSION
The economic expansion of 1991-2001 was
record setting. Besides its longevity—exactly 10
years—it will be remembered for three key fea-
tures. The first was the increase in the structural—
or trend—rate of labor productivity growth. The
burst of productivity growth was, in large meas-
ure, due to significant business expenditures on
fixed capital assets, particularly those in the
information processing equipment and software
category.
The second distinctive feature of the 1991-
2001 expansion was a spectacular appreciation
in financial asset prices. The Federal Reserve’s
Flow of Funds data show that the market value
of corporate equities held by U.S. residents
increased from $3.5 trillion at the end of 1990 to
$20.3 trillion by the end of the first quarter of
2000. This increase, roughly a 21 percent annual
B
y almost any yardstick, the U.S.
economy performed magnificently
during the last half of the 1990s and
into early 2000. Paced by tremendous
increases in the nation’s capital stock, which
helped boost productivity growth to rates not
seen on a sustained basis since the 1950s and
early 1960s, real GDP growth averaged a little
more than 4 percent from 1995 to 2000. More-
over, inflation declined as output grew more
rapidly than it had for many years.
Last year’s recession was in many ways one
of the most unusual in business-cycle history.
Outside of manufacturing, which reached its
peak in June 2000, the slowdown was much less
pronounced and took longer to materialize. Hence,
with some industries continuing to grow in 2001
even while others were pulling back, there was
the feeling that the economy might skirt an offi-
cial economic recession. However, forecasters,
who had previously thought that a recession
might be avoided, changed their outlook imme-
diately after the terrible events of September 11.
Suddenly, recession was a certainty. For example,
the October Blue Chip consensus forecasts for
the third and fourth quarters of 2001 were revised
down to –0.4 percent and –1.3 percent, respec-
tively, from the pre 9/11 forecasts of +1.3 percent
and +1.6 percent. It was not until late November
2001, however, that the Business Cycle Dating
Committee of the National Bureau of Economic
Research determined that the nation’s record-long
business expansion had ended in March 2001.
To properly understand the dynamics of the
last recession, we need first to identify the key
characteristics of the record-long business expan-
sion that preceded it. That is where I’ll begin. Irate of gain, was phenomenal by historical stan-
dards when benchmarked against the size of the
economy. During much of the post-World War II
period, the market value of corporate equities as
a percent of nominal GDP ranged from just under
40 percent to almost 100 percent. But from late
1990 to early 2000, this share skyrocketed from a
little under 61 percent to nearly 210 percent. Of
course, much of this boom was driven by excesses
in tech stocks, but even the broad and compre-
hensive Wilshire 5000 Index saw extraordinary
growth.
The third key development was the steady
decline in inflation to a rate that approximates
price stability. Though one could probably list
several other important developments, I believe
that these are the most important. Moreover, and
more importantly for present purposes, the three
characteristics of the late 1990s I’ve emphasized
set the stage for the recession that we just went
through.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 2001
RECESSION
One can point to several distinguishing char-
acteristics of the 2001 recession. I am using the
past tense because I am inclined to believe the
recession is over. While it is possible that recent
data are deceiving us, I believe that the recession
most likely ended in December 2001 or January
2002. The final call will be with the Business
Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau
of Economic Research. If the recession ended in
January, it will have lasted 10 months—just short
of the 11-month average for post-World War II
recessions. However, the recession was very mild.
Real GDP declined only a modest 1.3 percent
annual rate during the third quarter, and no other
quarter experienced negative growth. Assuming
that 2002:Q1 experienced reasonably solid growth,
which seems likely, the four-quarter growth rate
never dropped below zero. In contrast, the aver-
age peak-to-trough decline in real GDP during
post-World War II recessions was about 2 percent.
In view of its mildness, some have asked
whether we had a recession at all. The Business
Cycle Dating Committee has indicated that it is
not inclined to rescind its call. The event will be
known by whatever name the National Bureau
chooses to call it. I’ve called it the “Pluto
Recession”—after the planet, not the dog. My
moniker stems from the fact that astronomers
argue over whether Pluto is really a planet. Some
say it is closer to being a chunk of ice than a small
planet—on the borderline, at best. Any border-
line object is, by definition, borderline. Rather
than engage in a useless debate resulting from a
fuzzy dividing line, let’s just call 2001 the year
of the Pluto Recession.
This recession, like all previous post-World
War II recessions, was dominated by a substantial
swing in business fixed investment. After little
growth during the fourth quarter of 2000 and the
first quarter of 2001, business expenditures on
capital goods—structures and equipment and
software—fell sharply over the final three quarters
of 2001. This investment bust, though, came on
the heels of the investment boom of the latter half
of the 1990s: From 1995 to 2000, investment in
equipment, software, and structures grew at an
average annual rate of 10.6 percent, much higher
than the 3.9 percent rate from 1973 to 1995. Look-
ing at the composition of the late 1990s surge in
spending shows that firms chose to devote an
increasing share of their capital budgets to pur-
chases of high-tech capital: From 1995 to 2000,
real investment in information processing equip-
ment and software rose at an annual rate of 20.2
percent, whereas from 1973 to 1995 spending on
these capital goods rose at a 13.2 percent rate. By
the end of 2000, high-tech investment expendi-
tures were roughly 37 percent of total business
fixed investment, more than double the roughly
15 percent share seen in 1973. By contrast, the
share of business fixed investment in structures
declined from an all-time high of roughly 42 per-
cent in early 1982, to just under 24 percent by
early 2000.
The end product of this investment boom
was a huge increase in the growth of U.S. manu-
facturing capacity. The capacity increase out-
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a gap of excess capacity, especially in the area
of high-tech equipment such as computers and
semiconductors. For example, from 1995 to 2000,
while real GDP grew at an annual rate a bit above
4 percent, capacity in industrial machinery and
equipment (including computers and office equip-
ment) grew at an 11 percent rate. Capacity growth
was higher yet in the semiconductor sector. The
size and persistence of this gap between output
growth and growth of manufacturing capacity
was unprecedented for an expansion phase dur-
ing the post-World War II period.
The surge in investment in information and
telecommunications investment did yield a surge
in labor productivity growth, as firms replaced
outdated equipment with new equipment embod-
ied with the latest technology. The boost in eco-
nomic efficiency, accordingly, gave rise to sizable
gains in real income, earnings, and profits. The
latter two developments, of course, helped fuel
the tremendous rise in equity prices—particu-
larly those of technology firms. At some point, it
appears that market participants decided that the
pace of investment in high-tech capital goods
had outstripped the long-term earnings prospects
of many high-tech firms. As expectations were
brought into alignment with long-term economic
realities and firms re-evaluated their need for
high-tech equipment, equity prices—particularly
those reflected in the Nasdaq index—descended
from their stratospheric level.
In contrast to the plunge in business fixed
investment during the recession, residential fixed
investment grew every quarter, except for the
fourth quarter of last year. Typically, housing
tends to turn down about nine months before the
peak of the expansion, and then continues to
contract for about six months into the downturn.
In the 2001 recession, however, real residential
fixed investment began to pick up before the cycle
peak and remained strong. This is an interesting
point because it shows that the recession was
not linked to investment per se but instead to a
particular component of investment.
I believe that one reason that housing fared
so well during the recession was that, unlike
typical recessions, long-term interest rates
declined significantly in advance of the cycle
peak. In the typical recession, long-term rates
rise until the cycle peak, give or take a month or
two. This time, however, the peak in the 10-year
Treasury rate preceded the cycle peak by about
10 months. A significant portion of that decline
in long-term interest rates was attributable to the
market’s conviction that inflation was not an issue,
an understanding based on a monetary policy
that has consistently pursued the objective of
maintaining a low and stable rate of inflation. A
measure of inflation expectations is the spread
between the 10-year conventional and inflation-
adjusted Treasury securities. That spread declined
by about 70 basis points during the year prior to
the recession’s onset. As long-term interest rates
came down following the spring of 2000, resi-
dential fixed investment received a significant
boost. The boost was not sufficient to completely
offset weakness in other sectors of the economy,
particularly the manufacture of high-tech capital
goods and structures, but was important in limit-
ing the severity of the downturn in the aggregate
economy.
Inventory investment almost always plays an
important role in economic contractions. The
2001 recession was no exception. Indeed, the
inventory cycle this time was as pronounced as
any since World War II. The inventory-sales ratio,
measured by the ratio of real inventories to real
final sales, is perhaps the best measure of inven-
tory behavior. This ratio tends to turn up about
six months before the cycle peak, as firms accu-
mulate unwanted goods when demand growth
slows. Then, the ratio typically increases mod-
estly for about three months into the recession.
As firms liquidate excess stocks, the recession
deepens. As inventories come into line with
sales, the ratio begins to edge downward as the
recession ends and the next expansion gains
momentum.
In the 2001 recession, however, the inventory-
sales ratio rose three months before the cycle
peak and then declined. As the manufacturing
sector began to weaken in mid-2000, firms seemed
particularly eager to aggressively cull their stock
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3of inventories. This inventory draw-down con-
tinued in earnest into 2001, culminating in a
$119 billion drop in inventory investment in the
fourth quarter of 2001. This inventory liquidation,
relative to real GDP, was the largest for any single
quarter since World War II. In fact, the inventory
liquidation over the four quarters of last year has
not been seen since the 1948-49 recession.
It is really quite remarkable that the inventory
liquidation was so large considering that the
recession itself was so mild compared with one
like 1981-82. As Chairman Greenspan has noted
on several occasions, one possible explanation
for the behavior of the inventory-sales ratio this
time is that innovations in information technology
and management processes allowed firms to adjust
to the emerging slowdown quicker than in previ-
ous recessions.
The final distinguishing characteristic of the
2001 recession was the behavior of consumer
spending. Economists and policymakers tend to
pay particularly close attention to consumer
spending because it is by far the largest component
of aggregate output—encompassing roughly 70
percent of total GDP. What is often ignored is the
relative stability of a large chunk of consumer
spending: Roughly 88 percent of total consumer
spending is on services and nondurable goods,
which tend not to fluctuate a great deal quarter to
quarter. The remaining 12 percent of consumer
expenditures is spending on durable goods,
which, because expenditure patterns often change
quickly when real incomes and interest rates
change, is relatively volatile. Durable consump-
tion goods are really a form of household invest-
ment, and demand depends on many of the same
basic determinants as does business demand for
capital goods. As with residential investment
during this recession, the behavior of consumer
durables points to the special nature of the down-
turn in business investment.
On average, real consumer spending, other-
wise known as real personal consumption expen-
ditures, or PCE, peaks at the same time as the
official NBER cycle peak. Of course, one reason
for the coincident timing is that the NBER Cycle
Dating Committee pays close attention to the
monthly pattern of real consumer spending when
determining cyclical turning points.
This time around, however, real PCE kept
increasing throughout most of 2001—albeit at a
modestly slower rate of growth—rather than
declining early in the recession, as is usually the
case. Evidently, consumers were not sufficiently
persuaded to cut back on their expenditures to
the degree that manufacturers were. Last year’s
tax cuts likely helped bolster household incomes
and, hence, spending. In any event, in the fourth
quarter, consumer spending came roaring back,
surging at a 6.1 percent annual rate—a pace not
seen for three and a half years. Much of the
strength was concentrated in consumer durables,
which rose at the astounding annual rate of 39.4
percent. In an average recession, real consumer
durables expenditures decline about 3.5 percent.
But between the first and last quarters of last
year, consumer durables purchases rose by 10.8
percent. A key part of the story was new vehicle
production, which surged in response to the
exceptionally rich sales incentives offered by
automotive manufacturers in the aftermath of
September 11. These events were obviously
unique to this recession.
A factor that I believe is important for under-
standing the strength in consumer spending dur-
ing the last recession is the atypical behavior of
short-term interest rates. Typically, short-term
interest rates rise until the cycle peak and then
decline substantially, usually until the neighbor-
hood of the cycle trough. This time around, short-
term interest rates began to decline about four
months prior to the cycle peak. The reason was
that policymakers responded much more quickly
during this recession than during previous reces-
sions. The FOMC began reducing its target for
the federal funds rate three months before the
cycle peak. Moreover, compared with previous
recessions, the FOMC’s rate cutting was very
aggressive. The effective funds rate was reduced
by 475 basis points from January to December.
Hence, it seems to me that the recession’s
comparative mildness is due in large part to better
monetary policy. As I have just mentioned, the
FOMC responds quickly and aggressively to signs
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4that the economy was weakening. But just as
important, and perhaps more so, for some time
now the FOMC has pursued a policy of reducing
the long-run inflation rate to a level where con-
cerns about inflation play a minor role in eco-
nomic decisionmaking. This long-term policy
has not only succeeded in fostering a significantly
improved inflation outlook, but also has enhanced
the Fed’s credibility as an inflation fighter, thereby
affording the FOMC considerable leeway to act
aggressively to reduce the federal funds rate dur-
ing this recession. Finally, because the market
understands this process, long-term rates began
to decline long before the FOMC acted to reduce
the target federal funds rate. Long rates reflect
anticipations of future short rates; the decline in
long rates is evidence of market anticipations of
what the FOMC did, at least in broad outline.
Monetary policy was not the only factor work-
ing to offset the economic downturn, as other
economic forces were also at work. A key reason
for the apparent strength of this recovery is the
spectacular pace of labor productivity growth
during the recession. Nonfarm productivity
increased 2 percent during the 2001 recession;
this performance was surpassed only by the excep-
tionally mild recession seen in 1969-70, and the
milder-than-average 1948-49 recession. By con-
trast, productivity growth turned negative during
the 1990-91 recession, though it did rise during
the subsequent recovery.
WHAT WILL THIS RECOVERY
LOOK LIKE?
As we have seen, one of the most striking
aspects of the recession was the degree to which
the contraction was concentrated in the business
investment goods sector. Decomposing the contri-
bution of real GDP growth, measured at an annual
rate, over the last three quarters of 2001 shows
that the roughly 0.2 percent growth in real GDP
was apportioned in the following manner: real
business fixed investment contributed –1.6 per-
centage points; real private inventory investment
contributed –1.1 percentage points; real residen-
tial fixed investment was essentially flat; real PCE
contributed +2.2 percentage points; the govern-
ment sector contributed +0.9 percentage points;
and real net exports contributed –0.2 percentage
points.
To sum up, here is where the economy stands
heading out of the recession: consumption is rel-
atively strong; fixed investment is relatively weak;
inventories are quite lean; housing was strong
early in the recession, but tailed off during the
fourth quarter of 2001. Moreover, there is little
strength in foreign demand for U.S. goods and
services.
While a decline in investment spending typi-
cally is an important factor in an expansion‘s
demise, it is also usually an important factor
pulling the economy out of most postwar reces-
sions. The payoff from investment opportunities
on proposed plant and equipment expenditures
that appear dubious or speculative shortly before
and during the recession, suddenly become more
favorable during the recovery.
On average, four quarters after the trough of
business activity, real fixed investment increases
by about 13 percent. Interestingly, though, it is not
a surge in business capital spending that is the
catalyst, although growth is usually fairly robust
(around 9 percent), but rather the key driver
behind the surge in fixed investment spending
early in a recovery is a spike in residential fixed
investment: On average, real residential fixed
investment spending is nearly 26 percent higher
four quarters after the trough. Another driving
force during most expansions is consumer pur-
chases of durable goods. Spending on consumer
durable goods typically increases by about 16
percent during the first four quarters of a recovery.
The question is whether the same pattern
will hold during this recovery. I believe the typi-
cal pattern is unlikely to recur this time for several
reasons. First, the strength of residential fixed
investment spending during most of the recession
suggests there is little pent-up housing demand
on the part of households. Second, the recent
rise in long-term interest rates will inevitably act
to dampen the burst in new and existing home
sales that we saw last year. Moreover, the home
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time high of 68 percent. During the latter half of
the 1990s, the housing industry benefited tremen-
dously from a sharp rise in the home ownership
rate, which had stayed roughly constant at 64
percent from 1985 to 1995. We don’t readily know
why home ownership rates began to accelerate.
Certainly, the steady deceleration in inflation
kept mortgage rates during the latter part of the
1990s considerably lower on average than they
were during much of the 1970s and 1980s. The
strength in housing may have been related in part
to the surge in equity values, which afforded
many households the wherewithal to buy rather
than rent. In any event, it seems unlikely that
residential investment will get a boost from this
factor going forward.
The third factor, the outlook for business fixed
investment, is harder to gauge. One possibility is
that the rate of business fixed investment will be
somewhat attenuated relative to the average post-
war recovery. As I noted earlier, the tremendous
rates of growth in business expenditures on equip-
ment and structures seen during the latter half of
the 1990s led to breathtaking increases in manu-
facturing capacity—particularly in the high-tech
sector. Moreover, with the cost of equity capital
much higher now than it was in the late 1990s,
the relative cost of capital means that the break-
even point on proposed capital investment proj-
ects—the so-called “hurdle rate”—is appreciably
higher today than, say, two or three years ago.
It is important to remember, however, that
high-tech capital goods such as computers,
servers, software, and telecommunications
equipment tend to depreciate much faster than
other types of capital goods. As a result, relatively
faster rates of gross investment will be needed to
keep the net investment rate constant. Moreover,
business fixed investment is likely to get a boost
from the fact that the real price of high-tech goods
is likely to continue to decline somewhat, so that
the hurdle rate for high-tech goods is likely to
continue to decline. Finally, continuing oppor-
tunities for productivity gains from the applica-
tion of new technology may sustain a high rate
of investment.
With PCE growth still fairly robust, it is diffi-
cult to see how the economy can get a large boost
from consumer spending, especially if, as some
have suggested, consumers have truly become
more conservative in the wake of 9/11. The
inventory-sales ratio is very low, so the economy
should get a significant boost as firms rebuild
their inventories. All in all, however, I expect
this recovery to be somewhat milder than the
average recovery; the average following the eight
post-World War II recessions excluding the short
1980 recession was about 7.5 percent real GDP
growth for the first four quarters of recovery.
Going forward, then, the factors I have out-
lined above, along with the fact that this reces-
sion was extremely mild, suggest the prospects
for a typical post-recession boom are not terribly
favorable. There is, however, a competing con-
sideration. Fiscal policy turned more expansion-
ary last year, and monetary policy became, I
believe, highly expansionary. Money growth was
high and short-term interest rates were driven
down to a low level. Expansionary policy may
show up somewhere, or a little bit in lots of




The shape of the economy in coming years
will depend critically on the rate of productivity
growth. Everyone is now aware of just how impor-
tant productivity growth was to the economy’s
performance from 1995 to 2001. Although there
is much we do not understand about productiv-
ity growth, it appears that the structural, or long-
run, growth rate of nonfarm labor productivity is
about 2.5 percent. This is a sizable increase from
the roughly 1.5 percent growth experienced from
1973 to 1995. Growth of the labor force adds
another 1 percent to GDP growth; thus, a reason-
able working assumption is that potential output
should grow in the neighborhood of 3.5 percent.
If productivity growth remains at this higher level,
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6the boost to the real incomes of future generations
will be large.
The second issue is the long-term inflation
rate. The economy’s performance in recent years—
both the high rate of growth in the 1990s and its
resilience in the face of recession and the shock
of September 11—is evidence of the payoff from
sustained low inflation. The Federal Reserve is
ultimately responsible for the trend rate of infla-
tion, and I see no reason why past success on
this front cannot be extended indefinitely. It is
certainly true that maintaining low inflation is
inherently easier than bringing inflation down.
But success in maintaining low inflation will not
come automatically—the Fed must not fall asleep
at the switch.
SUMMING UP
As a member of the Federal Open Market
Committee, I am always sensitive to develop-
ments that could threaten the nation’s two main
macroeconomic goals: price stability and sus-
tained economic growth with full employment.
While all too often these goals of growth and low
inflation are seen as competing, in truth they are
congruent. The experience of the 1990s should
put to rest the notion that price stability is incom-
patible with low unemployment. The most impor-
tant contribution monetary policy can make to a
high rate of economic growth is to maintain a
low and stable rate of inflation. By virtue of past
success on the inflation front, in 2001, monetary
policy was able to respond vigorously to forestall
a deep recession and to lay the foundations for
the recovery. Last year’s policy actions, combined
with the economy’s natural dynamics, provide
the ingredients for a solid recovery. The strength
and duration of the expansion just now beginning,
however, ultimately depend on policymakers
remaining focused on keeping the inflation rate
low and stable. As the economy settles into a
pattern of sustained growth, policy will also adjust
from recession-fighting mode to economic-growth
mode. Unless forecasters are far off base in their
view of the economy’s prospects, in time short-
term interest rates will rise to maintain a monetary
policy consistent with long-run price stability.
The timing of such rate increases is not something
that can be planned in detail, but will depend
on the arrival of information on the economy’s
progress and on possible risks to price stability.
Although no one can rule out surprises, the
economy is stable and poised for higher growth.
That is certainly a pleasant environment for pol-
icymakers, and it is nice to be able to end these
remarks on that note.
Dynamics of the Recession and the Recovery
7